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A B S T R A C T
Enforcement of rules and laws designed at the national level is still one of the dominant institutional mechanisms
for eﬀective multiscale governance in most countries. At times, such blanket regulations are not only unable to
meet practical needs at local levels, but they may conﬂict with local institutional logics, thereby creating new
challenges. This study looks at three institutional arrangements in the agriculture and food security sector in the
district of Koutiala, Mali to analyse the institutional variety across scale and the underlying institutional logics.
On one side, the Cooperative Law as well as the Seed Law both designed at national level to enable famers’ access
to agriculture services and improved seeds have yielded mixed results with regard to anticipated outcomes. The
cooperative law is believed to degrade the social cohesion and the mutual support on which vulnerable farmers
rely when facing climatic and non-climatic risks whereas the new seed system is found onerous and unaﬀordable
for farmers. On the other side, the local convention for the management of natural resources established as part
of ongoing decentralised governance policy seems to resonate with local culture but challenged by other sta-
keholders. Through exploring these cases, this paper tests bricolage as an analytical framework for doing an
institutional diagnostic. It aims at contributing to methodological and theoretical insights on the way sustainable
institutions can be generated in conﬂicting institutional logics in the context of multi-scale governance
1. Introduction
Achieving food security and improved nutrition is at the heart of the
sustainable development goals (Herbel et al., 2012). If there is a con-
sensus on the importance of food security as substrate for development,
the critical steps for achieving this goal in developing countries are still
under debate. Some proponents advocate for expansion of technologies
and more intensive use of agricultural inputs and equipment, re-
miniscent of the Asian green revolution (Ejeta, 2010). Other scholars
stress the need to have an enabling institutional environment in place to
support the uptake of agricultural technologies (Glover, 2011;
Hounkonnou et al., 2012). They warn against the de-contextualized
blueprint approach of one-size-ﬁts all solutions as the remedy for
strengthened food security in the highly diversiﬁed agriculture systems
of Africa. In this regard, most studies associate food insecurity with
structural causes (Gregory et al., 2005). It is believed that political
commitment, eﬀective institutions, and a system approach of innova-
tion and adequate investments can improve the living conditions of
smallholder farmers.
In Mali, crop production has traditionally formed the basis for
pursuing food security. This has been a long standing priority of suc-
cessive governments since the country’s independence, in 1960.
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Structural responses to food insecurity in Mali have primarily consisted
of policy reforms to enable increased agricultural production. Such
reforms include the Loi d’Orientation Agricole (LOA), a comprehensive
agricultural development framework enacted in 2006 that aims to
promote sustainable and competitive agriculture in the country
(Bélières et al., 2008). This framework advocates for land reform that
encourages ownership right to secure long-term investments on agri-
cultural lands. The LOA was also designed to support the management
of natural resources and to facilitate farmers’ access to inputs (fertilizer
and seeds), equipment and government subsidies (Mercoiret, 2006).
Overall, ensuring food security may require a synergy of interven-
tions both with the use of innovative agricultural technologies and with
the creation of an enabling institutional environment. In this paper, we
are interested in understanding the mechanism through which con-
ducive institutional conditions are created that enable increases in
productivity (Glover, 2011). Many approaches have been sought for
creating an enabling environment for agricultural innovation. One of
these came from the Convergence of Sciences – Strengthening Innova-
tion Systems (CoS-SIS) program, which tested a collaborative approach
– Innovation platforms- for institutional changes. It took a group of
stakeholders through a process of learning and interaction, with the
explicit aim of building synergy among them to enhance their in-
novative performance (Hounkonnou et al., 2012; Kilelu et al., 2013).
The ‘Innovation platform’ approach takes into account limiting factors,
mostly institutional, that may hinder the increased use of technologies
(Hounkonnou et al., 2012; Nederlof and Pyburn, 2012). While in-
novation platforms have revealed valuable insights into institutional
change, there has been less understanding of whether and how the
position, interests, and commitments of facilitating agents may inter-
fere with the platform agendas and outcomes (Turner et al., 2016).
Additional research on institutions has tended to emphasize how
organizational processes are shaped by institutional forces that re-
inforce continuity and reward conformity (Garud et al., 2007). A body
of literature has recently emerged that examines “institutional en-
trepreneurship” through which organized actors leverage resources to
create new institutions or to alter the existing ones (Leca, 2009). In
spite of their valuable contributions, this research faced criticism for
overemphasizing the heroism of powerful entrepreneurs while ignoring
the context and the agencies of these actors (Leca, 2009). The gaps in
these approaches to studying institutional change show that there is still
much to do in understanding institutions and how they operate in
practice. As Rodrik (Rodrik, 2010) proposes in his macroeconomic
analysis to diagnose what an economy “is good at”, this paper aims to
contribute to the diagnostic of institutional variety across scales. It aims
at understanding what institutional logics at diﬀerent scales are “good
at” in terms of creating and sustaining enabling institutional environ-
ment for food production and subsequent food security.
The paper documents the institutional logics of three case studies.
The ﬁrst case study focuses on farmer cooperatives and analyses the
rules and routines enforced by new national legislation in replacement
of traditional village associations. The argument behind this new ar-
rangement was to better facilitate members’ access to agricultural in-
puts and services to enhance food production. The second case is about
the institutional arrangement of seed systems in Mali. The new agri-
cultural development framework includes a Seed Law aimed at facil-
itating farmers’ access to high quality seed. Seed is considered a major
driver of production increase and the government has devoted sig-
niﬁcant eﬀort to improve access of farmers. The third case, oﬀering
another example of a cross-scalar institutional divide, relates to the
institutional arrangement established through the local convention for
the management of natural resources. This case highlights the process
of the devolution of tasks and responsibilities to local communities
through the decentralization policy. The reactions and controversies
relating to these three examples of institutional arrangements are
analyzed below to bring insights on diagnosing institutions.
The next section describes the context of the three cases and high-
lights the key elements relevant for understanding the embeddedness of
institutional logics (Section 2). The theoretical framework of institu-
tional bricolage against which the empirical data are analyzed is de-
scribed in Section 3. The research methods used to generate data are
captured in Section 4, followed by the ﬁndings which consist of the
contextualized analysis of the three case studies (Section 5). The dis-
cussion and conclusion are presented in Section 6, as well as an analysis
of the way institutional bricolage plays out in diﬀerent contexts.
2. Description of the context of the studies
Mali is a landlocked country of West Africa that spreads over
1,241,000 square kilometers. Mali belongs to many organizations, at
sub regional, African and international levels including OHADA
(Organisation pour l’harmonisation du droit des aﬀaires en Afrique). Since
its independence in 1960, diﬀerent ideologies on governance have been
applied as those in power have changed over the years. From
1960–1968 the ﬁrst governing body ruled the country under soviet
socialist inﬂuences (Amselle, 1978). This ﬁrst government was over-
thrown in 1968 by a military coup, and the single-party military regime
that followed lasted 23 years. Since 1991, a new era of democracy has
opened the political and administrative systems to decentralized gov-
ernance. The decentralization is aimed at encouraging the transfer of
responsibility over resources from the state onto local authorities at the
level of municipalities (Fay, 2000).
The country is divided into 10 regions (two new regions have been
recently created in the North and the North-East of the country) and
Bamako the capital city. The administrative decentralization created
703 municipalities of which 666 are rural. The total estimated popu-
lation of the country in 2009 was over 14,000,000 inhabitants of which
50.4% were women. Nearly 65% of the total population is under 25
years of age. About 70% of the population live in rural areas and base
their livelihoods on agriculture. Agriculture makes up 45% of the gross
domestic product (Anderson and Masters, 2009).
The farming system includes cotton as the main cash crop, alongside
with millet, rice, maize; herding cattle, sheep, goats and ﬁshing. In the
South (Sikasso Region), the farming system is organized around cotton.
In areas crossed by the Niger and Senegal rivers and their tributaries,
the farming is organized around irrigated rice production, with greater
or lesser control over water depending on the irrigation scheme in
place. Similarities in the organization of extension staﬀ around these
two farming systems can be seen with the overall importance allocated
to diﬀerent forms of farmers’ organizations as a means of channeling
services between extension oﬃces and producers. Along with the spe-
ciﬁc extension organization around rice and cotton, a central extension
oﬃce providing rural advice and farm guidance to producers is in
charge of crops that fall outside the rice and the cotton farming systems.
Overall, these approaches to the farming system in Mali are aimed at
the diversiﬁcation of activities to minimize risks. This diversiﬁcation
also includes natural resources management, seed production, and oﬀ-
farm activities.
3. Theoretical framework
In this article, we draw on institutional theories of poly-
centricity—the relationships among multiple authorities with
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overlapping jurisdictions—to investigate the institutional logics of the
three cases. A growing body of theoretical literature has developed on
polycentric governance (Oakerson, 1999; Ostrom, 2009). This literature
has made the case that the study of political systems needs to consider
the degree and forms of nestedness of political actors within larger po-
litical systems. In contrast to a structuralism approach to institutional
change in which human action is limited to the implementation of
rules, the patterns of interaction and outcomes depend on the re-
lationships among governance centers at diﬀerent levels and the pro-
blems they are addressing (Oakerson, 1999). In their analysis of the
governance of natural resources, Anderson and Ostrom (Andersson and
Ostrom, 2008) explain that imperfections may exist at any level of
governance. They argue that analysts should consider the extent to
which complementary backup institutions exist at higher or lower level
of governance that can help oﬀset some of the imperfections at any one
level.
In the context of polycentric governance in Mali exempliﬁed in the
diversity of political institutions on one side, and administrative de-
centralization on the other, we consider the institutional bricolage as an
interesting theoretical perspective to look into for diagnosing how in-
stitutions work in practice. Diﬀerent bodies of institutional thinking
have been deployed to explain how community members, as hetero-
genic entities with diﬀerent trajectories respond to externally driven
processes (Adjei-Nsiah and Klerkx, 2016). Cleaver provides a frame-
work of ‘institutional bricolage’ to highlight how people adapt, transform,
and ﬁnd new solutions to their challenges. She explains the bricolage as
a “process in which individuals consciously and subconsciously draw on
existing social formulas to patch or piece institutions together in response to
changing situations” (Cleaver, 2012). The bricolage indicates the dif-
ferent ways in which stakeholders respond when new institutions are
introduced into pre-existing settings. Cleavers assumes that there are at
least three plausible outcomes of bricolage. First, when a new institu-
tion is introduced it can be accepted by stakeholders, and then re-
combined with diﬀerent types of existing socio-cultural elements. This
is what Cleaver named aggregation. The second plausible scenario is
called alteration and happens when stakeholders decide to adapt the
introduced institutions to make them better ﬁt their livelihoods. The
third option relates to a possible resistance by stakeholders to new in-
stitutions by maintaining their institutional identities and culture (ar-
ticulation) (Cleaver, 2002; Cleaver and Franks, 2005).
While institutional bricolage aims to understand how institutions
work in practice, it is acknowledged that the embedded context – his-
torical legacies, cultural inﬂuences, political logics, and economic dri-
vers- is not neutral and cannot be ignored (Hassenforder et al., 2015).
For example, in the analysis of irrigation systems in rural Ethiopia, Gutu
et al. (Gutu et al., 2014) highlight that a comprehensive assessment of
the institutional bricolage requires a complete understanding of the
characteristics of people's agency, of the existing constraints and en-
ablers that lead people to behave in one way or another. Likewise, by
building on the case-study of the Rwenzori forest in Uganda, it is es-
tablished that attempting to explain how institutions work cannot be
done in isolation without understanding the historical, social and cul-
tural context in which the arrangement is introduced (Hassenforder
et al., 2015). External factors could limit or enable the eﬀectiveness of a
bricolage process.Therefore, the way stakeholders respond to in-
troduced institutions must be analyzed in close relation with external
factors as well as social, historical and economic drivers.
Decentralization reforms aiming at transferring power from central
to local authorities, are a major catalyst for the participation of local
communities in the control over existing natural resources (Ribot,
1995). By introducing local governance structures, the decentralization
reforms expect at furthering ‘good’ governance of natural resources at
the local level. But in practice, decentralization may also generate
tensions between natural resources management structures, often
comprised of public servants and local communities with diﬀerent ex-
pectation and stakes. We recognize that decentralization itself may
appear as an institutional arrangement to which community members
and administrative oﬃcers respond in diﬀerent ways depending on
whether or not each category of actors perceive their interests are af-
fected. In this arena of tension between possible antagonistic interests,
the decentralization reforms can be seen as key contextual factors,
which may inﬂuence the “bricolage”outcomes.
In this paper, we analyze the way bricolage plays out in three case
studies of institutional arrangements, of which two are characterized by
state driven top-down governance and one consisting of local stake-
holder driven management of natural resources whereby local people
have space to design their own rules, guiding the collective use of the
forest resources. The paper looks into these two cross-scale institutional
logics to derive insights on what each institutional logic is good at and
how does this speak to institutional diagnostic in multiscale and poly-
centric institutional environments.
4. Materials and methods
4.1. Site characteristics
The research presented in this paper has been undertaken as part of
the Adaptation at Scale in Semi-Arid Regions (ASSAR) project. ASSAR is
an interdisciplinary research initiative, which aims to better understand
the barriers and enablers for adaptation to climatic and non-climatic
risks in semi-arid regions of Asia and Africa (Padgham et al., 2015). In
West Africa, it covers the trans-boundary transect that crosses Wa in
Ghana, Bobodioulasso in Burkina Faso and Sikasso in Mali. The transect
is characterized by a generally intermediate level of food security
(supply of calories per capita) but poor nutritional status (e.g. lowest
national ratings in Mali) in spite of Mali and Ghana scoring relatively
high overall among 187 countries in terms of dietary quality (Imamura
et al., 2015).
The ASSAR research site in Mali is the Koutiala district (Sikasso
region). Koutiala is known as the district of “white gold” in reference to
the importance of cotton production as the main driver of the agri-
culture system and food production in the area. Rainfed cotton pro-
duction started in this area at the end of the colonial period. Ninety
percent of the district’s population numbered at over 575,000 people
according to the census in 2009 is involved in cotton production. The
intensive production of cotton, combined with population growth and
climate risks have resulted in the degradation of land and other natural
resources such as forests, water sources and grazing areas.
More than a cash crop, cotton production is critical for food pro-
duction. In Mali until now, fertilizers have been subsidized for cotton,
maize and rice, but not for other cereal crops, which are also widely
grown alongside cotton. Therefore, the membership in cotton co-
operatives is considered by farmers to be a strategy for accessing sub-
sidized inputs for crops that are not covered by the subsidy policy. The
central role of farmers’ cooperatives in addressing agricultural chal-
lenges including access to improved inputs and management of natural
resources makes the three case-studies presented here a relevant entry
point to diagnose how institutions work, in practice, around the pro-
duction dimension of food security.
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4.2. Research design
A qualitative multi-scale comparative design (Lawrence et al., 2002)
has been combined with an in depth analysis of three case studies of the
following institutional arrangements: farmers’ cooperatives, the seed
system and the local convention for the management of forest re-
sources. Selected techniques including collective-choice arrangements,
monitoring, and conﬂict resolution mechanisms from the design prin-
ciple (Ostrom, 1990) are combined with institutional logics to analyze
the three institutional arrangements. The collective choice arrangement
relates to the extent to which individuals aﬀected by the institutional
arrangement are authorized to participate in making and modifying
their rules. The monitoring refers to the level of trust and reciprocity
among appropriators of institutional arrangements to keep levels of
rule-breaking down. Conﬂict resolution refers to the question of how
appropriate the institutional arrangement is in terms of rapid, low-cost,
local conﬂict resolution among users or between users and oﬃcials
(Ostrom, 2009).
Mediated by diﬀerent institutional logics, namely the top-down and
the local accountabilities logics, the three cases have been selected to
cover the interlinked social and biophysical dimensions of agricultural
production, including farmers’ organizations, the seed system and the
management of natural resources. Koutiala has been named as one of
the most vulnerable districts in Mali to climatic and non-climatic risks
due the negative implications of the long history of cotton production in
combination with population growth (Dietz et al., 2006). Mpessoba, the
national hotspot in terms of degradation of natural resources, is located
in the district of Koutiala (Ellis-Jones et al., 2014).
The research presented here combines various sources of data col-
lected at diﬀerent stages of the project, including semi-structured in-
terviews carried out in the course of a scoping phase of 3 weeks, which
was conducted in 5 villages. Over the scoping phase, 26 focus group
meetings involving 150 farmers were conducted to identify major
challenges that face the communities. The scoping phase was intended
to embed the research in key issues of concern for the population. It
identiﬁed the governance and institutional challenges around farmer
cooperatives, the seed system and the management of natural resources
as some of the major concerns in the district.
Following the scoping phase, twelve more focus group discussions,
and 63 semi-structured interviews and informal discussions helped to
lend greater contextual detail to the three cases. These data were en-
riched with information collected during previous ﬁeldwork in July
2015 and October 2016. The data focuses on perceptions and decision
making processes in uncertain conditions of food security. Interviews
were digitally recorded with permission of the interviewees. The re-
cordings were transcribed and transcriptions were thematically ana-
lyzed through coding.
5. Findings
5.1. The institutional arrangement around farmers’ organizations
The history of farmers’ organizations (FO) stems from the colonial
period. These organizations were originally promoted to facilitate local
communities’ access to extension services. FO were developed from the
traditional forms called “tons” which were the foundation of the social
organization and the repository of the village authority. Groups were
organized along socially deﬁned lines including women, youth, and
hunters, and endowed with tasks of performing collective, socio-cul-
tural actions and securing the village against aggressions (Droy et al.,
2012).
Following Malian independence, socialist ideology inspired the
post-independence government to adopt so-called “cooperativisation” of
production based on household membership. Farmers’ groups were
then established around speciﬁc tasks of collective interests such as
mutual support in farming activities, marketing, and ﬁghting against
bush ﬁres in the villages. Over time, these organizational forms were
manipulated by elites for as channels for political messages (Bratton,
1990). Such an intermingling of farmers’ organizations and speciﬁc
political agendas resulted in tensions and the abandonment of farmer
organizations by many people who were unhappy with the political
undercurrents.
After being rebutted by the second republic after the coup in 1968,
farmers’ cooperatives gained momentum in the 80 s with the liberalized
economic policy. Production and household-based membership to vil-
lage organizations called “Associations villageoises” were created to en-
compass collective interests and to establish trust between cotton
farmers and extension oﬃcers. However, in this new system, extension
oﬃcers were accused of cheating on the cotton weight as well as the
production inputs and cotton revenues (Droy et al., 2012; Girard et al.,
2008). Resulting frustration led to many farmers dropping from cotton
production altogether. To prevent a spillover eﬀect of farmer exit,
structural reforms were implemented in the village associations. Village
associations were then tasked with keeping records of the amount of
inputs distributed, weighing cotton production, and recovering credits
after selling the cotton production. Though they have no lawful status,
farmers’ associations took the responsibility of ensuring the trade of
cotton, the distribution of inputs, and the diﬀusion of technical advice
to members.
In 1988, new reforms were introduced to enable the establishment
of “Ton villageois”, but diﬀerent from the traditional social groups. Ton
villageois became an umbrella for several village associations, created in
a location controlled by both the cotton company and the Oﬃce du
Niger, the management body of the rice irrigation scheme, around the
Markala dam.
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In 2001, things changed again when a new national cooperative law
was enacted to provide a juridical status to all cooperatives. Today, the
current forms of cooperatives called Societés Cooperatives des Producteurs
de Coton (SCPC) are resulting from that law. These cooperatives were
tasked with the role of ensuring the distribution of inputs for cotton and
cereal crops among members. They also collect the cotton produced by
members and channel it to the cotton company. Further, they are re-
sponsible for the management of input credits for their members. These
reforms were pushed for by the International Labor Organization (ILO)
and implemented in the framework of the production systems im-
provement program called Programme d’Amélioration des Systèmes
d’Exploitation (PASE) with the anticipation of creating a more conducive
regulatory environment for the autonomy and accountability of pro-
ducers. Beyond the shift from Associations Villageoises (AV) to co-
operatives, the PASE also introduced the idea of an inter-profession
umbrella organization endowed with economic and extension service
functions oriented toward all agriculture commodity chains.
In the meantime, in 2010 the uniform act of the Organization for the
Harmonization of Business Rights in Africa (OHADA) was endorsed by
the Malian government. The OHADA act overrules the national co-
operative laws, and as a consequence, all forms of farmers’ organiza-
tions in Mali were required to harmonize their bylaws and functioning
with the OHADA act by May 2013. This harmonization was one the
prerequisites presumed to make farmers’ organizations eligible for in-
stitutional supports such as public funding. One farmer who is still
member of the SCPC oﬀers his view of this top-down process when he
states: “we were not involved in the advent of cooperatives, they have been
imposed by the law and we are victims of a situation over which we have no
control. Nobody asked our point of view before the advent of cooperatives”.
The trajectory of the organization around cotton, from traditional
Associations Villageoises to Cooperatives is captured in Table 1.
According to farmers, the shift from Associations Villageoises to co-
operatives did not materialize in practice at all. Respondents argue that
the written regulation of the cooperatives in French is problematic
because many farmers do not read in French. Further, in practice, they
see no diﬀerence between the routines of the newly created co-
operatives and the former village association. A cotton farmer from
N’Goutjina stated: “Though at odds with the provisions of the cooperative’s
bylaw; the selection of the members of the steering committee as well as the
duration of their terms in duty are still inspired by the practices and routines
based on trust that have prevailed in the former village associations”. In
other words, rather than being elected, members of the steering com-
mittee are designated by inﬂuential members in the village. In addition,
despite the roles being well deﬁned in the bylaws, the secretary of the
cooperative is still carrying out several functions outside his mandate,
which is not recognized in the oﬃcial cooperative structure. The terms
of the steering committee is not renewed and for many members ex-
ceeds the 3-year term deﬁned in the bylaws. Some members of the
cooperative in N’Goutjina are reported to be in place since its inception
in 2006.
However, previously organized by the cotton company, the mem-
bers of the cooperative seem happy to be fully entrusted with the re-
sponsibility of organizing the trade of cotton to the company, including
the provision and the management of input credits and the distribution
of cotton revenues. As stated by a cooperative member: ‘We are no
longer cheated with the weight of our production and we feel no pressure
from extension oﬃcers for the repayment of credits.’ Respondents agree
that the management of collective funds has improved. The resources of
the cooperative coming from members’ contributions are now kept in
accounts opened at the agriculture bank rather than being kept with the
secretary. According to respondents this prevents the cooperative from
the misuse of the resources by the secretaries as was the case previously
in the village association. The withdrawal of funds from the accounts
requires the signature of 3 members. It is therefore recognized that the
management of funds has improved in the cooperative compared to the
VA form. The contribution of the cooperatives to the development of
the community, including through infrastructure construction, is also
acknowledged with some reservations.
Tensions do exist though, between cooperative leaders and tradi-
tional authorities. Some farmer leaders are blamed for using co-
operative investments meant for infrastructure and village development
for their personal promotion in spite of the guidance of the traditional
authorities. This practice is rebuked by many interview respondents as
they believe it results in more interference of the cooperative members
in village decision making and the erosion of the village institutional
authorities.
Table 1
Evolution from traditional Associations Villageoises to Cooperatives.
Events Organizational forms
2010 (Harmonization of business rights – OHADA-and endorsement
by the government)
“Societés Coopératives des Producteurs de Coton (SCPC)"
2001 (New cooperative Law enacted) – Formalised entities guided by the OHADA regulation
– Many SCPC in the same village. SCPC formed based on members’ ability to work together.
– Existence of a form of social guarantee known as the caution solidaire in which all the SCPC members
are held responsible for re-payment of loans and inputs
1988 (Structural adjustment reforms) “Ton villageois”
– Inspired from the traditional groups, but one Ton at the village level
– Village based membership group organized around cotton
1980 (Emergence of liberalized economic policy) “Associations villageoises”
– Household-based membership and groups organized around cotton production
– Many “Associations villageoises” coexisted in the same village
1968 (Political coup and rejection of socialist regime) Failure of collective interest groups and break-down of “Cooperativisation”
1960 (Independence) “Cooperativisation”
– Inspired from the socialist ideology.
– One “Cooperative” for each village
– The group is based on household membership.
– Farmers’ groups were established around speciﬁc tasks of collective interests (mutual support in
farming activities, marketing, and ﬁght against bush ﬁre)
Before 1960 “Tons”
– Traditional groups organized around social groups (women, youth, and hunters)
– Many “tons” co-existed in the same village
– Groups were endowed with tasks of collective interest (socio-cultural actions and securing the village
against aggressions)
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Some respondents also report the degradation of the inter- and
intra-household social cohesion, and the traditional mutual support
among villagers. The binding liability, one of the rationales of the co-
operative, did not produce the expected outcomes. This is the process
through which all the cooperative members are held responsible for
repayment of loans, and is blamed for degrading social cohesion. It
obligates the better-oﬀ farmers to pay the credits for the poor ones.
“This resulted in several cooperatives collapse” explained several re-
spondents. “In surviving cooperatives, the individualistic interests are taking
over at the cost of the collective interest which is one of the alleged rationales
of the cooperatives”, one respondent goes on to explain: “Those who fail to
pay their credits for inputs and equipment run the risk of being brought to
court.” One farmer who was subject to this process commented on the
time consuming nature of the juridical procedures and explained that
he was called upon in a very diﬃcult, high-workload period for a
farmer. He states the following: “I ended up by calling upon a brother
living in Bamako to repay the credit to save my agriculture season. He ad-
vised me to leave the cooperative but I cannot as I have no other option to
easily access subsidized fertilizers”.
The tensions emerging from these situations are jeopardizing the
mutual support in the village. According to respondents, those who own
enough equipment and animals are no longer helping the most vul-
nerable, ill-equipped farmers. They report that the trust between vil-
lagers is fading away. They argue that it is becoming harder for the
most vulnerable people to fall back on the generosity that allowed
better-oﬀ farmers to loan or gift some cereal grains or credit to poor
farmers who faced food shortage. The form of social guarantee con-
stituted in the binding liability supposed to help the poor farmers access
the basic agriculture equipment by credit is therefore quite con-
troversial. The reluctance of getting these credits paid back by the
better-oﬀ farmers is causing the cooperative to step back from this
commitment. The access to credit is limited for poor farmers. According
to some farmers, including the one who was brought to court, “as they
have no other alternatives, they stay members mainly to beneﬁt from the
inputs, including subsidized fertilizers for their cereal plots which they cannot
aﬀord otherwise”.
Despite the degradation of the social cohesion within the villages,
the workers of the cotton company have diﬀerent opinions about the
implications of the shift. All respondents from the company en-
thusiastically believe that the shift from VA to cooperatives has im-
proved the ﬁnances of the company. They report having achieved the
objective of full repayment of the credits owing to the binding liability
in comparison with the period of the VA during which their credits
constantly suﬀered backlog. Furthermore, they believe that farmers are
happy as there is no longer pressure from the extension oﬃcers for the
repayment of credits, all being handled now within the SCPC. When the
company purchases the cotton production of one village, credits are
deducted from the village revenue; the rest of the funds are managed by
the cooperative members. In this way, in spite of the grievances the
cooperatives are recognized to contribute to the development of the
village.
5.2. The institutional arrangements around the seed system
In Mali, seed production, distribution and use are regulated by the
new agricultural development framework – Loi d’Orientation Agricole –
enacted in 2006 to promote sustainable and competitive agriculture.
Following the seed regulation, only certiﬁed seeds are qualiﬁed for sale.
The certiﬁcation gives oﬃcial endorsement of the seed meeting the
national requirements in terms of germination rate and testing dates.
This seed regulation aims to ensure farmers’ access to high quality seed
and therefore to increase agricultural productivity and food security.
However, in spite of the seemingly helpful seed regulation, the
majority of farmers continue to rely on their traditional seed. More than
80% of the seed used still comes from the “unregulated” traditional
seed systems (Diakité et al., 2017). Farmers’ associations ﬁnd the
certiﬁcation process onerous and expensive. According to the estimates
by the national farmers’ associations in Mali (AOPP) the certiﬁcation of
one ton of sorghum seed, for instance, costs on average CFA 85,000
(Euro 130) for both ﬁeld inspections and laboratory operations. The
seed certiﬁcation facilities are based in Bamako, the capital city. The
farther the production area from Bamako, the more costs the certiﬁ-
cation incurs. In this regard, although farmers register as seed produ-
cers, they often continue to sell their seeds via informal networks with
no quality control, which aﬀects the crop yields and undermines the
eﬀort to promote improved varieties and to adapt to the changing
agricultural conditions (Van Mele and Guéi, 2011).
To help deal with these challenges, private seed companies have
recently emerged and begun partnering with farmer associations
(Sanyang et al., 2016). The seed companies pay for the seed production
and certiﬁcation costs and purchase the resulting seeds from farmers.
The challenge these arrangements face is that the agreement between
seed producers and private companies restricts direct sale between seed
producers and individual farmers. At the same time, the seed companies
sell the certiﬁed seeds at a relatively higher price than most smallholder
farmers can aﬀord. Furthermore, with this arrangement in which seed
enterprises are playing the intermediary role between seed producers
and users, the producers neither have contact with the seed market nor
cannot develop the necessary skills and knowledge to properly market
their seeds (e.g., determining the market’s preference, developing me-
chanisms of price formation, and strategies of advertising, packaging
and branding).
In general, although the seed regulation was enacted to facilitate
farmers’ access to high quality seeds, the gaps between the seed reg-
ulation and the local conditions in which farmers operate hinder the
implementation of the regulation and prevent the majority of farmers
from access to improved seed, therefore creating unintended negative
impacts on their production and food security.
5.3. The institutional arrangement around natural resource management
The ﬁrst democratic government in 1991 adopted the decentralized
governance system and transferred executive mandate (decision power)
over natural resources to local communities. Local conventions for the
management of natural resources became part of the institutional set-
ting at the community level.
The local convention, according to respondents, has been estab-
lished after the villagers realized that because of the depletion of re-
sources, the distance to access ﬁrewood has become longer and un-
bearable for women alongside the erratic rainfall they attribute to that
depletion. In this regard, the village N’Goutjina set local rules, which
imposed a 10-month ban on the logging of woods in the forest. During
the remaining two months of the year, women are allowed to fetch a
volume of ﬁrewood which amounts to 4 loads of a donkey-cart.
According to the head of the committee, the regulation, which is in-
spired from their traditional rules for the management of natural re-
sources, aims at maintaining the contribution of natural resources,
which he believes is closely related to agriculture production and food
security. A committee including men and women selected within the
community is in place to ensure that people enforce the regulation.
Violators are expected to pay a ﬁne of FCFA 20000 (Euro 30.5), a goat
and a rooster. According to respondents, the local convention estab-
lished for 5 years is working quite well so far. A lead member of the
surveillance committee states the following: “everybody shows under-
standing towards this regulation, as it has been collectively agreed upon. As
you know, the development of the local convention is inclusive. So far we did
not even resort yet to the ﬁne which is used just as dissuasive tool”.
A member of the community conﬁrms that local conventions re-
sonate better with local conditions compared to the national regulations
relating to forest, which are enforced and commonly misused by the
forest oﬃcers. ‘They systematically impose ﬁne to all ﬁrewood even those
collected from dead trees. We do not understand what kind of regulation is
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that’.
The process for developing a local convention brought together the
community members and extension oﬃcers from decentralized public
services, including from the forest service. However, not every parti-
cipant in the process agrees with the local convention. The district of-
ﬁcer working for the forest service ﬁnds the ﬁnes for violators to be
illegal. According to him, “only the state has the power to impose ﬁnes on a
contravener to the rules”.
Overall, the decentralization of governance requires the transfer of
public mandate to local communities. Though local communities seem
more comfortable with the local conventions, tension still persists
around the eﬀective implementation of these local institutions. Table 2
provides a comparison of the three cases, with regards to the selected
variables.
6. Discussion
The three case studies used to create an enabling environment for
enhancing food production have been analyzed to explore how in-
stitution works in practice. In line with the institutional bricolage
perspective, the three institutional arrangements prompted diﬀerent
reactions among stakeholders. Looked at from the scale perspective,
both the top-down driven arrangements, including farmers co-
operatives and seed regulation and the institutional arrangement in-
clusively crafted at the local level around the management of natural
resources, exhibit both imperfections and beneﬁts. As imperfections
raise the question of eﬀectiveness and sustainability, the diversity of the
three case studies provides an opportunity for analyzing what diﬀerent
institutional logics are good at. The institutional diagnostic conducted
with the top-down logic to elicit central regulations for farmers’ access
to services and inputs proved imperfect. The logic of the Cooperative
Law is to facilitate the access of farmers’ organizations to institutional
supports. It assumes that trust and transparency are required for farmer
cooperatives to be able to capture the existing opportunities, including
access to funds and governmental supports. It was assumed that elected
control bodies should be in place to make this change happened. The
ﬁndings show however, that members of the control committee are
selected by inﬂuential leaders, instead of being elected. In addition, the
bylaws of the cooperative set a three-year term for the control com-
mittee, but in practice, the term of the steering committee has never
been renewed. Hence, the trust building and the control rationale of the
reforms have been slightly undermined and re-adjusted, which can be
seen as a form of passive articulation.
Moreover, with the newly introduced regulation, the members of
the cooperatives have more control over the cotton sector, which im-
proves the transparency in management of collective resources. It has
been widely acknowledged that the poor management of farmers as-
sociations was one of the major challenges that hindered cotton pro-
duction in many West African countries (Sinzogan et al., 2007; Bingen,
1998). The new regulation introduced in the cooperatives after 2001
aimed at improving the resource management. For instance, the with-
drawal of funds from the cooperative accounts requires at least the
approval of 3 members. This new arrangement has also improved the
relationship between farmers’ organizations and the cotton companies.
Informal discussions with company workers indicated that, for many of
them, the shift from “Associations villageoises” to cooperatives has im-
proved the ﬁnances of the cotton company and strengthened trust be-
tween farmers’ organizations and cotton companies. The interviews
also show that cooperative members seem to be happy with the man-
agement. This substantiates that an aggregation and alteration of the
institutional arrangement around farmers ‘cooperatives is taking place
as they are quite adapted to the sociocultural context. The bricolage
aspect of aggregation is also reﬂected in the cooperative rules. Co-
operative members adhered to the principles of the new rules, which
improve resource management. Of course, farmers’ leaders who took
proﬁt from the old rules might not be happy, but the new regulation
seems strong enough to impose a better management as reported during
the ﬁeldwork.
The Cooperative Law, in many ways, has also stimulated the al-
teration of relationships among community members. The research
shows that the introduction of new regulation has created tension be-
tween individual interests and collective support. The cooperative rules
to some extent, challenge the social cohesion. They give the opportu-
nity to individual farmers to select the community members with whom
Table 2
Comparative table of the three institutional arrangements.
Variables National cooperative law National seed law Local convention for the management of
natural resources
Institutional logics Top-down; Condition eligibility for public
support
Top-down; National accountability for
farmers’ access to high quality seed and
increased agricultural productivity and
food security.
Local accountability and awareness of the
depletion of Natural resources
Collective-choice arrangement (individuals
aﬀected by the institutional arrangement
are authorized to participate in making
and modifying their rules)
Low Low High
Monitoring (level of trust and reciprocity
among appropriators of institutional
arrangement to keep rule-breaking levels
down)
High High High
Conﬂict resolution mechanisms (rapid, low-
cost, local arenas to resolve conﬂict
among users or between users and
oﬃcials)
None None None
Achieved outcomes Coop responsible for trade of cotton
products and village development but
Degradation of the intra- and inter-
household cohesion and mutual support
Onerous and expensive seed
certiﬁcation system
Seems to resonate with the community,
but, although unenforced a ﬁne on those
who bypass the rules is challenged by the
forest oﬃcers
Tension between coop. members and
village authority
Seed certiﬁcation facilities only in
Bamako
Seeds sold via traditional and informal
system with no quality control
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they have ability to work together. This new structure was designed to
guarantee the repayment of loans and inputs. On one side, vulnerable
farmers tend to believe that the cooperative makes them most vulner-
able, since investments in collective interest such as building social
infrastructures is no longer a priority. Also, this arrangement has ex-
cluded some farmers, who can no longer beneﬁt from the collective
liability for access to production inputs. In this regard, both aggregation
and alteration aspects of bricolage play out. On the other side, most
farmers ﬁnd themselves relieved from the pressure that was exercised
on them from the cotton companies to recover the inputs credits. The
cotton companies are also satisﬁed with the management of the input
credits. All the actors concur with the fact that the management of the
inputs credit and the marketing of cotton is now under the responsi-
bility of cotton farmers. In addition, there is a recognition of the
transparent use of cooperative resources. Therefore, despite the grie-
vances towards the arrangement of cooperatives, there are still at place
with most farmers remaining as members.
In the seed regulation, farmers can only produce and sell seed after
certiﬁcation, but as they cannot aﬀord the certiﬁcation cost, they found
the alternative to bypass the regulation by contracting with seed com-
panies to supply a stated amount of raw material against a guarantee of
purchase. The company has provided the contracted farmers with the
seed of high yielding varieties, fertilizer, and connect with the seed
oﬃcers for certiﬁcation. The seed regulation has been navigated and
tweaked to ﬁt with farmes’ capacity and conditions. Since they were not
able to aﬀord the certiﬁcation cost themselves, they looked for alter-
native and this bricolage practice of alteration helped seed producers to
explore new options for their local production.
Some seed farmers also save part of their production, and against
the formal seed regulation, sell it locally to their peers. They do so,
because the certiﬁed seed is hardly available at the village level and the
price of certiﬁed seed is relatively higher than the traditional seed.
Although the national seed regulation is accepted with the establish-
ment of a new form of collaboration with seed companies, farmers also
resisted to accept the rule because of the high cost of the certiﬁcation
process. While the national seed regulation intended to limit the use of
traditional seeds, many farmers are still using them. Therefore, both the
aggregation and the articulation forms of bricolage are reproduced.
The locally designed regulation for the management of natural re-
sources also exempliﬁes the imperfection of institutional diagnostics
and logics that the locally designed regulation would help to reduce the
pressure on the natural resource. The rules based on the local con-
ventions are both an aggregation and an alteration of the polycentric
decentralization process in Mali. On one side, community members are
allowed to play the key role in the management of local resources. On
the other side, the enforcement of a ﬁne on those who bypass the rules
is challenged by the forest oﬃcers who think this level of governance
lies with the state. The community members think the local rules re-
sonate better with their culture and expectations compared to the na-
tional regulations, believed to be designed without knowledge of the
context in which they are supposed to be applied. It is not clear how-
ever whether the rules resonate with local culture because they are
good, or because of a lack of enforcement. The interviews show they did
not resort yet to the ﬁne. That begs the question of what could happen if
the ﬁne is operationalized. As the response to this question remains to
be seen, it is diﬃcult to conclude about the sustainability and the ef-
fectiveness of local rules and the way they could inform the national
institutional mechanisms and governance of natural resources.
Overall, each case of institutional arrangement combines diﬀerent
dimensions of bricolage suggesting positive and negative sides
(Table 2). The questions remains of what could be learnt from the three
cases in terms of diagnosing institutions. Whether accepted in the form
of aggregation or alteration or rejected in the form of articulation, the
three institutional arrangements share the characteristic of stimulating
the debate about what institutions are good at.
The positive and negative outcomes visible in the institutional
arrangements substantiate Anderson and Ostrom’s view, in their ana-
lysis of decentralized resources regimes, that imperfections may exist at
any level of governance (Ostrom, 2009). In such conditions, the scalar
institutional diagnostics that precede the release of new rules and
regulations are ﬂawed and may result in institutions that conﬂict with
diﬀerent contexts. This also suggests that each institutional logic is
therefore good at revealing its own pitfalls once put into praxis. In this
regard, we argue that rules do not exist in a vacuum and are then dif-
ﬁcult to be fully diagnosed with only the partial picture of the context
in which they are used. They make sense only when put into practice.
Regardless of the scale from which new institutions are introduced, in
the context of polycentric governance, the institutions and institutional
diagnostics and subsequent logics are good at providing raw material to
be reﬁned in the process of institutional bricolage. Therefore, regardless
of from where grievances are voiced, institutional bricolage provides a
framework for creating more appropriate institutional arrangements by
bringing corrective measures to imperfect institutional diagnostics. This
suggests the need for a ﬂexible mindset and behavior from development
practitioners. Rather than focusing solely on outputs and immediate
results to craft a new institutional arrangement there is need to learn
from the outcomes and long-term sustainability embodied in the pro-
blem-solving, process-driven genesis of existing institutions (Herbel
et al., 2012). Farmers’ organizations, as well as the seed law and the
natural resources management rules were crafted to address practical
problems communities are facing. We therefore argue that the diﬀerent
institutional logics could synergize through ﬂexible process driven me-
chanisms. In this regard, national and district level actors can proac-
tively engage in collaborative institutional bricolage with local actors
gathering around contextualized needs and problem-solving capacities.
From this proactive institutional bricolage around praxis (Hounkonnou
et al., 2012; Nederlof and Pyburn, 2012), cross-scalar institutional lo-
gics will likely emerge to form what Lawrence refers to as proto-in-
stitutions. These may become fully ﬂedged institutions as the colla-
boration matures across scales (Lawrence et al., 2002). We therefore
share the hope that shifting the focus to the ﬂexible practical work of
actors will help lead to an easier and more compelling translation of
institutional ideas into non-academic discourses (Leca, 2009).
7. Conclusion
The three cases resulted from diﬀerent logics. The topdown ar-
rangement was based on the assumption that creating conditions that
facilitate farmers access to agricultural services and inputs would en-
hance food production. The bottom up approach was used by com-
munity members to design local rules for managing natural resources.
While the topdown approach faced grievances from local community
members, the bottom up arrangement failed to support changes beyond
community boundaries and generated tension with public oﬃcials. In
general, whether the regulation was designed at national or local level,
neither were fully accepted by users. The controversies around these
institutional arrangements show that both approaches failed to consider
either agency of local players or the national guiding principles. This
indicates that institutions cannot be eﬀective when proposed by high
level actors who assume to know enough about local communities’
needs and conditions to design rules for them. Likewise, bottom up
approaches designed from within a particular local context are unlikely
to achieve management goals for a much larger scale without broader
organizational structure. Overall, the institutional diagnostic is likely
incomplete when conducted at one scale in isolation from social em-
beddedness of other scales. The study highlights the need for integrated
top-down and bottom-up planning approaches to support eﬀective in-
stitutions that work across scales.
The research also shows that a single institutional diagnostic cannot
capture all reality with one sequence. The diagnostic should therefore
be an ongoing and iterative process which may require long term in-
vestigation with multiple sources to cross-check and provide a deep
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understanding of historical, political, and social contexts that all play a
role in institutional mechanisms.
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